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ABSTRACT
With the shift of public discourse to social media, we see
simultaneously an expansion of civic engagement as the bar
to enter the conversation is lowered, and the reaction by
both state and non-state adversaries of free speech to silence
these voices. Traditional forms of censorship struggle in this
new situation to enforce the preferred narrative of those in
power. Consequently, they have developed new methods
for controlling the conversation that use the social media
platform itself.
Using the Central Asian republic of Kyrgyzstan as a main
case study, this talk explores how this new form of “subtle”
censorship relies on pretence and imitation, and why inter-
disciplinary methods of research are needed to grapple with
it. We examine how “fakeness” in the form of fake news and
profiles is used as methods of subtle censorship.
1. ADVERSARIAL FAKENESS
We examine fakeness at two levels:
1. Fake news, which we define as a deliberate presentation
of either misleading or untrue claims as journalistic
reporting.
2. Fake profiles, which we define as digital entities in
which either i) the persons with the alluded identi-
ties did not really create and/or control the profile, or
ii) the identities are fabricated and hence cannot be
attached to any real person.
In both cases, what characterizes “fake” is adversarialness:
the active intention to falsify or mislead for purposes bene-
ficial to theagent and harmful to the target.
In concert with these cases, our preliminary results sug-
gest the possible existence of semi-fake profiles, in which a
real user, perhaps for financial or ideological reasons, “leases”
their identity to an adversary.
Recently, fakeness has been associated with “hybrid war-
fare” [2], but this framing is too military-oriented to encom-
pass the phenomenon. Civilian activities such as election
and marketing campaigns are increasingly deploying fake-
ness in order to sway public opinion and consumer interest
against rival politicians and brands. Hence, fake news and
profiles would be better conceptualized in broader terms of
“adversarial fakeness”, i.e., when malicious deception occurs
as a direct action by an agent seeking to harm a target.
Our framework enables a fuller vision of the threat the
world is facing. As a form of hybrid warfare, adversarial
fakeness inflames inter-communal grievances and mobilizes
populations against each other. As a form of disinformation,
it undermines the integrity of journalism, elections, and mar-
kets. As a form of censorship, it drowns out moderate and
alternative voices, and targets journalists, civil society orga-
nizations, opposition politicians and human rights activists.
2. SUBTLE CENSORSHIP
Adversarial fakeness itself can be conceptualized as “sub-
tle censorship.” Insofar that censorship can be considered at
root as any attempt to silence information, the phenomenon
can be broadly taxonomized in a) strategic terms of with-
holding information, destroying information, altering or us-
ing selective information, and self-censorship, and in b) tac-
tical terms of explicit or implicit, direct or indirect. Subtle
censorship is different in that it relies primarily upon pre-
tense and imitation to silence information. As a result, it
obfuscates whether censorship is even happening.
Traditional forms of censorship are attractive for schol-
ars and activists because they imply their own solutions. In
philosophical terms: if P) there is a censor censoring, then
Q) counter-censor by circumventing (re. withholding infor-
mation), archiving (re. destroying or manipulating informa-
tion) or whistle-blowing or reforming (re. self-censorship).
In contrast, subtle censorship eludes measurement, does not
imply its own solution, and has three unusual forms:
Silencing through attacks.
Fake accounts are actively used to directly attack journal-
ists and activists through social media posts and comments,
the primary purpose of which is to intimidate individuals
or groups into silence and submission. The example of the
reporter Nedim Turfent is highly illustrative.
In 2016, while on assignment in Turkey’s Kurdish region
for the pro-Kurdish Dicle News Agency, Turfent published
video of soldiers threateningly standing over villagers, who
were face down with their hands bound. Soon afterward,
Twitter accounts that were later discovered to be linked to
Turkish counter-terrorism units began taunting locals with
the question, “Where is Nedim Turfent?” In the words of
Bloomberg magazine, ”The threat was clear: Give him up,
or you’re the next target” [9]. Within days, Turfent was in
military custody and charged with membership in a terrorist
organization. The Twitter-based manhunt abruptly ceased
when one of the accounts tweeted a photograph of Turfent
in custody. He remains in jail.
Independent from the political views of Turfent, this in-
cident illustrates the growing problem of silencing through
attacks, especially with respect to journalists.
Silencing through noise.
An effective method of censoring opposing viewpoints is
to simply drown them out [13]. For example, automated
and semi-automated fake accounts are frequently deployed
to flood social networks with fake news and inflate content
views, to the point that opposing perspectives appear to be
in the minority or disappear down the newsfeed. As there is
often an asymmetric distribution of resources favoring those
already in power, this type of censorship can be quite effec-
tive and difficult to counter. So-called “troll armies” are the
example par excellence of this form of censorship. However,
more sophisticated tactics than just sheer volume exist. For
example, “hashtag poisoning” attacks, in which bots or fake
accounts tweet a trending opposition hashtag repeatedly in
order to trick Twitter into considering the hastag as spam,
have been used in Mexico and elsewhere to effectively censor
anti-government discussions [3].
Silencing through misinformation.
Similar to silencing through noise, fake accounts are also
used for making audiences un-receptive toward real news al-
together. For example, Kyrgyzstan was destabilized in June
2010 when inter-ethnic clashes between Kyrgyz and Uzbeks
were sparked by fake news about Uzbek gangs sexually as-
saulting Kyrgyz women and Uzbek separatists attempting to
join neighboring Uzbekistan. In the years since, fake news
has claimed Uzbeks are undermining the“Kyrgyz character”
of the state and are spreading radical Islam in the country.
Fake news also promotes the idea that Uzbeks and the in-
ternational community are engaged in an “information war”
against the Kyrgyz nation [7]. This engenders a defensive
mindset throughout Kyrgyz audiences, rendering it impos-
sible to discuss alternative views about the 2010 events.
3. BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT
Our research focuses on Kyrgyzstan, which is on the front-
line of adversarial fakeness and subtle censorship. In a region
notorious for authoritarianism, Kyrgyzstan boasts a gener-
ally free market and parliamentary and presidential elec-
tions held according to a schedule and rules, not the whims
of ruling elites as happens among its neighbors. The qual-
ity of elections is marred by widespread vote-buying and
tampering by the ruling party through state mechanisms,
but the 2017 presidential election was considered genuinely
unpredictable by international observers [8]. In 2018, the
Economist Intelligence Unit assessed Kyrgyzstan as a “hy-
brid regime” on a trajectory toward becoming a “flawed
decmocracy” (the same category as the United States) [12].
As such, Kyrgyzstan stands out among its neighbors as
having a genuinely free mediascape, with very little explicit
censorship [1]. The capital, Bishkek, acts as a “haven” for
journalists from across Central Asia [4], and the Interna-
tional Exchange and Review Board has assessed Kyrgyzs-
tan’s domestic mediascape as “near sustainable” in its 2019
Media Sustainability Index [5]. Yet, self-censorship is a ram-
pant practice among local journalists [6], partially due to a
history of periodic violence against the profession, and par-
tially due to ruling elites exploiting the weak judicial system
to target the press with inflated slander lawsuits.
Throughout Central Asia, state control of ISPs is the
norm, whether by overt monopolization or covert means.
Kyrgyzstan not only lacks such control, but it also has “no
functional legal and technical provisions exist for shared use
of existing infrastructure by ISPs, forcing them to build re-
dundant and expensive infrastructure” [11]. Although the
state-owned KyrgyzTelecom remains the largest ISP within
the Kyrgyz market, this situation nonetheless poses quite a
hurdle to potential state surveillance and censorship.
With respect to adversarial fakeness, geostrategic issues
crucial to Kyrgyzstan’s sovereignty are the target of cam-
paigns involving fake news and profiles. In 2015, fake news
about an imminent nuclear war between the United States
and Iran, as well as about American support for “gay pro-
paganda” and Uzbek separatism, rallied public support for
the pro-Russian Kyrgyz government to shut down an Amer-
ican military base and cancel an important 1991 bilateral
treaty. Since 2018, fake news about Chinese “imperialism”
has fuelled violent anti-Chinese demonstrations throughout
the country, risking another crucial relationship. Demon-
strators have called for bans on Chinese citizens from doing
business in Kyrgyzstan and marrying Kyrgyz women.
4. NEW CENSORSHIP, NEW METHODS
As a problem to be combated, social media platforms are
actively seeking solutions to adversarial fakeness and sub-
tle censorship. For example, Facebook has publicized the
fake accounts they have shut down, a majority of which are
shut down at the time of the account creation [10]. The
effectiveness of their methods, however, can only really be
evaluated internally and these platforms lack incentives to
enforce content moderation relating to fake news.
Although proposed solutions rely on machine learning meth-
ods, there are two problematic trendlines:
1. No uniting framework: Researchers focus on detecting
fake news or fake profiles as interconnected yet still
distinct phenomena, i.e., using one to detect the other,
but not really conceptualizing them as two sides of
the same coin (adversarial fakeness), and as occurring
within a larger practice (i.e., subtle censorship).
2. No human focus: Related to the lack of a uniting
framework, researchers also tend to focus on the fake
news propagation role of fake profiles, rather than on
the re-propagation role of audiences.
Our project in Kyrgyzstan broadens this research by com-
bining machine learning, philosophy, and journalism. With
our partners the Civic Initiative for Internet Policy, a Kyr-
gyz civil society organization, we have assembled a team of
journalists and researchers in Bishkek who are assisting us
in the following.
1. Establishing ground truth by manually identifying a)
fake accounts that seed fake news, and b) human be-
ings that serve as re-propagators.
2. After crawlers derive social graphs on both popula-
tions, deriving feature sets, then training classifiers
upon these features.
3. Validating results journalistically by a) utilizing con-
text knowledge to critically analyze the fake news sam-
ples and b) endeavoring to confirm claims made by
various sources regarding the origins of the examined
fake profiles.
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